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Choice of Law: How it Ought Not
To Be
by Friedrich K. Juenger
I.
When the Mercer Law Review sent me the transcript of the October
1996 Roundtable at the Walter F. George School of Law, I was curious
to learn what progress interest analysis has made since the death of its
founder, Brainerd Currie, more than thirty years ago. Alas, the
transcript confirmed my suspicion: there is nothing new to be found in
that corner of conflicts methodology. The participants discussed
shopworn cases and produced period pieces that might as well have been
written in the sixties. But while that era's symposia sparked lively
differences of opinion on essential points, the Mercer discussants, being
True Believers in Currie's methodology, all agreed on fundamentals.
Their choice of cases, hoary chestnuts from the fifties, sixties, and
seventies (only Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.' is of a more
recent vintage, although it, too, was decided well over a decade ago),
conveys the impression that that methodology is stuck in a time warp.
Currie's school may not be the only one to delight in anachronisms.
For instance, Cavers' landmark article, written in 1933, dealt with
married women's disabilities, a topic that had already inspired Benedikt
Carpzov in the seventeenth century. But Currie did appreciate such
fusty relics. In fact, he picked the very same issue as the topic for the
seminal piece he published in the late fifties, a time when married
women had long been emancipated. Given this antiquarian bent, it
seems that the obsolescence of an issue is a virtue rather than a vice in
the eyes of interest analysts. That would explain why Currie's
disquisition on Massachusetts women still occupies a prominent place in
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.
University of Michigan (M.C.L., 1957); Columbia University (J.D., 1960).
1. 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
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a recent casebook and why the analysts insist on discussing conflicts
problems such as those posed by the long extinct caps on wrongful death
recovery and guest statutes, a species of legislation dating back to the
thirties that has succumbed to law reform in all states except Alabama.
Alas, the academicians' enchantment with legal fossils has a drawback. Time spent on quaint oddities from the past is bound to distract
them from the issues of our days. For instance, they are bound to
overlook changes in the law that convert their favorite specimens into
ghost cases. Thus, no one at Mercer considered, in discussing Walton v.
ArabianAmerican Oil Co.,2the effect of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
44.1 on the resolution of the foreign law issue the case presented. More
importantly, scholars preoccupied with past problems are wont to pay
little attention to such current conflicts issues as those created by the socalled "reform" that has balkanized American tort law, or the choice-oflaw conundrums posed by mass disasters. As far as the latter are
concerned, of course, interest analysts may do well to avoid them. As
the Mercer Roundtable shows, their methodology complicates the
resolution of even run-of-the-mill two-party situations and would
therefore only heap further complexities on already complex cases.
I.
Practical considerations, in any event, do not seem to be uppermost in
the analysts' minds. Apparently, they look upon choice of law not so
much as a means to accommodate the exigencies of interstate and
international disputes than as a titillating intellectual exercise, a haven
far removed from real-world concerns, in Posnak's words, the "wacky,
zany, problematically wonderful world of choice of law."' With little
regard for Rosenberg's admonition that "the game is not being played so
[scholars] can flex their jurisprudential muscles," the analysts enjoy
their "three-dimensional chess games."4 Given the amorphous nature
of the two concepts that are central to their methodology-policies and
interests-there is an almost inexhaustible array of moves and
countermoves available to keep them entertained. Thus, any run-of-themill traffic accident can serve as the basis for a long and erudite
analysis of the policies and interests at stake.
Law review articles, as well as reported cases, reveal considerable
differences of opinion on what policies inform a particular statutory or
common law rule because, as David Currie notes, ascertaining these

2. 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
3. Transcript, Choice of Law: How It Ought to Be, 48 MERCER L. REv. 639, 642 (1997)
4. Maurice Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REv. 641,644 (1968).
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policies is a highly subjective matter.5 In addition, there is room for
disagreement on the interests a state may have in effectuating whatever
policies it may espouse. It should therefore come as no surprise that
interest analysis is not a unitary methodology but rather an agglomeration of "stagnant pools of doctrine, each jealously guarded by its
adherents."' Although this diversity of opinion offers much fodder for
publications, it is a bit of an embarrassment. After all, interest analysis
is designed to vindicate state policies and interests, a purpose it cannot
possibly serve well unless there is agreement on what these policies and
interests are. If such agreement is lacking, courts that follow Currie's
approach will inevitably sacrifice these precious commodities by
misjudging what particular policies and interests are at stake. If even
the analysts cannot agree, judges--invariably lost in our mysterious
science-can hardly be expected to figure out what the gurus cannot
divine.
III.
Worse yet, the Mercer Roundtable makes one wonder whether the
analysts actually possess the skills necessary to ascertain the policies
behind particular rules of decision. Certainly, their attempts to
determine the purpose of, say, guest statutes are not encouraging. As
a glance at Prosser's treatise will instantly reveal, these enactments
lacked any plausible policy; they were the product of relentless and
effective lobbying by insurance companies. In fact, the "policies"
underlying such legislation are sufficiently untenable that many courts
have held them unconstitutional. Assuming, however, that guest
statutes do represent a policy, whom was it designed to benefit?
Because the enterprises that lobbied them operate nationwide, the
argument that these enactments protect only "local" insurers (Allstate,
Nationwide!) against "collusion" (another unwarranted assumption, as
Similarly unconvincing are the
Prosser shows) is unconvincing.
speculations of the participants in the Mercer Roundtable, in discussing
Grant v. McAuliffe,' about the former Arizona law that abated tort
actions upon the tortfeasor's death. That obsolete rule never served any
discernible purpose; it merely attested to the remarkable staying power
of the old common law adage actio personalis moritur cum persona, as
yet another glance at Prosser would have shown.

5. Transcript, supra note 3, at 656, 670, 698 (Currie).
6. Herma Hill Kay, The Use of ComparativeImpairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An
Evaluationof the California Experience, 68 CAL. L. REv. 577, 615 (1980).
7. 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
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When analysts attempt to fathom the reasons behind the laws of
foreign countries, their efforts become wholly implausible. Take the
Zacatecan cap on tort damages, which was at issue in Hurtado v.
Apparently none of the
Superior Court of Sacramento County.8
Roundtable participants even realized that he was not dealing with
"Mexican law," but rather with the civil code of a constituent Mexican
state (yes, our southern neighbors do have a federal system). Also, the
pertinent provision is not "a wrongful death statute" as some of them
seemed to think; the civil law was never burdened by as questionable a
precedent as Baker v. Bolton.9 Rather, the Zacatecan Civil Code
ordained an across-the-board limitation on recovery for both personal
injury and death. To determine the policy behind it would of course
require a careful study of Mexican legal history rather than the
guesswork that mars the opinion in Hurtado and the pages of the Mercer
Law Review. To date, however, no analyst has undertaken such a study.
IV.
Looking at such examples of policy analysis done by Brainerd Currie's
followers, one may well doubt whether the analysts will ever get it right.
After all, they had thirty years to figure out the "policy" behind guest
statutes and, as the Roundtable discussion of Babcock v. Jackson1 °
shows, they still are at a loss to explain what it is. Nor have the
analysts ever managed to demonstrate that the notion of "interest" has
any substance, or even to explain what it actually means (in fact, some
of them seem to be uncomfortable with the term). Brainerd Currie used
to anthropomorphize states, depicting them as a bunch of egotistical
beings who are eager to have their law rather than someone else's apply.
The Hobbesian state of nature he hypothesized is hardly an accurate
depiction of our federal system. Nor does the tableau of warring states
he painted reflect the fact that the conflict of laws, for centuries, has
attempted to alleviate conflicts rather than to exacerbate them.
For these reasons, I doubt that interest analysis, taken seriously, has
much to offer courts called upon to resolve problems posed by real-life
interstate and international transactions. That methodology produces
an intolerable lack of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result,
which is the inexorable consequence of an approach premised on empty
imagery. The social cost of such an approach is great: counsel may
commit malpractice if they settle; run-of-the-mill traffic accidents must
be litigated up to the highest state court. Shrugging off such criticism,

8. 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974).
9. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
10. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
0
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the analysts argue that uncertainty also characterizes other fields of law.
They overlook, however, that uncertainties usually can be cleared up by
one supreme court decision. In contrast, because it requires an ad hoc
assessment of each case, interest analysis creates aperpetuum mobile for
stirring up conflicts litigation; supreme courts using that approach do
not settle issues but create them. But that does not seem to faze even
David Currie, who teaches at the University of Chicago, home of the
Coase theorem, where transaction costs are taken seriously.
V.
Given its obvious defects, what reasons can possibly explain the ready
acceptance of interest analysis by the judiciary? There must, of course,
be something about a loose and open-ended analysis that tempts judges.
Interest analysts are prone to invoke "legal realism," as several of the
Roundtable participants did, in support of their doctrine. But, how
realistic is the analysts' appreciation of the courts' handiwork? Of the
group assembled at Mercer, only Felix and Posnak acknowledged that
the intrinsic quality of conflicting rules of decision can play a role in
deciding choice-of-law cases. However, the judicial tendency to pick the
better law should be obvious to anyone who looks not only at opinions
but also at holdings.
The large majority of cases in which courts adopted the new learning
dealt with guest statutes (or their functional equivalent, intrafamily
immunity) and caps on wrongful death recovery. In most of these cases,
the courts skillfully employed interest analysis or other modern
approaches to avoid application of such "drags on the coattails of
civilization."" The true significance of the "conflicts revolution" was to
reflect, on the choice-of-law level, the substantive tort law revolution
that swept the country during the sixties and seventies. Because of
their indeterminacy, the new methodologies could serve the function that
the classical escape devices of yore used to serve, namely to enable
judges to reach the right result, in a much more effective fashion.
Most of the early cases that prompted the "conflicts revolution"
presented a stereotyped pattern: the defendant (or rather counsel for
the defendant's insurance company) dragged in from out of state one of
the various common law or statutory monstrosities, most often a guest
statute, that unreasonably impeded tort recovery. In a forum that was
not burdened by similar bad law, defense counsel's strategy could hardly
count on the favor iudicis. By manipulating such easily manipulatable
concepts as "interests" and "policies," judges readily avoided applying

11.

Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 209 (N.H. 1966).
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substandard foreign rules that offended their sense of justice. In other
words, the new approaches furnished a convenient escape device.
Amazing as it may seem, while Brainerd Currie did allude to this
phenomenon, most of his followers, though they claim to be legal
realists, apparently fail to notice what should be obvious.
VI.
The fact that interest, analysis glosses over what courts are actually
doing is apparent not only from the analysts' discussion of tort cases but
also from their apparent uneasiness with contract choice of law. The
court decision they chose for the Roundtable discussion of this subject
was Lilienthal v. Kaufman,"2 an oddball case that dealt with a spendthrift statute. Of far greater practical importance than the fascinating
problems such enactments may pose is, however, the power of individuals and enterprise to select the law they wish to govern their agreements. This power cannot be reconciled with conflicts theories that are
premised on sovereignty, be it the vested rights doctrine or interest
analysis. Joseph Beale condemned party autonomy as "absolutely
anomalous," 3 "theoretically indefensible," 4 and "absolutely impracticable."" Brainerd Currie largely avoided the subject, but to him
private interests simply did not matter, except to the extent that they
benefit from some governmental policy.
While spendthrift statutes rarely pose interstate and international
problems, each and every day individuals and enterprises throughout the
world execute and perform millions of contracts containing choice-of-law
and forum-selection or arbitration clauses. Agreements dealing with
transactions that cross state and national borders usually designate the
law the parties wish to apply in the case of disputes as well as the
forum, arbitral or judicial, that is to decide them. Such clauses are
usually upheld by the courts; the inconvenience to international trade
and commerce that would follow if party autonomy were not recognized
would be very serious indeed. To this day, interest analysts have had
precious little to say about this fundamental principle, although it is of
considerable practical importance. Presumably because it does not fit in
their calculus of governmental interests, they prefer to spend their time
on a more than three-decades-old Oregon case of no discernible current
relevance.

12.
13.
14.
15.

395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1080 (1935).
Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1084.
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VII.
Interest analysts, focused as they are on forum law, show little regard
for developments in other nations. Their lack of understanding of
foreign law in general is already evident from the strange "policies" they
impute to alien jurisdictions such as Zacatecas. But even comparative
conflicts writing does not attract their attention. The analysts' lack of
interest and understanding is apparent from Posnak's characterization
(after 800 years of scholarship which has produced an enormously rich
legal literature) of choice of law being "among the most or the most
unthought about areas of the law."16 David Currie evidences a
similarly detached attitude when he goes to some length to belabor the
elementary proposition with which the glossators were already familiar
(and to which they referred in terms of "real" and "personal" statutes),
namely that there is a choice between territorial or personal connecting
factors.
The loss of international perspective that the analysts' forum-centered
approach entails is regrettable, but it is only one of the numerous defects
from which Currie's methodology suffers. Having set forth, at greater
length and in greater depth, the problems and pitfalls of interest
analysis elsewhere, I limit my comments to specific flaws that surfaced
at the Mercer Roundtable. Whether my comments will be of much use
to the participants seems doubtful. As their replies to some searching
questions posed by members of the audience suggest, analysts do not
cherish criticism, even if it comes in the form of a polite inquiry.
Perhaps their internal disagreements about such details as, for instance,
how Baxter's notion of comparative impairment jibes with the call for
moderate and restrained interpretation in Brainerd Currie's last article
are simply too absorbing to leave much time for the queries of outsiders.
But even if the discussants may have been less than forthcoming
about what others perceive as weaknesses of their methodology, the
Mercer Roundtable has had the salutary, if unintended, effect of
highlighting some of its flaws. While much has been written about
conflicts theory in recent years, we have lacked a discussion exclusively
among interest analysts' in terms of their own methodology. It is
commendable that the Mercer Law Review will not only preserve a
record of such a discussion but also enable outsiders to append some
critical remarks. Clearly, the time is ripe to realize the truth of the
prediction Max Rheinstein made thirty-five years ago, that "American

16.

Transcript, supra note 3, at 642 (Posnak).
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conflicts law has ...

been led into a dead-end alley."17 Three-and-a-

half decades of experimenting with interest analysis ought to be
sufficient for the realization of the obvious fact that this is not what
conflicts law ought to be.

17.

Max Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrift, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 632, 633 (1962).

